Trespass to Chattel, Conversion, and Detinue in Nigerian Law: A Complete Guide

If you have studied trespass to land, the structure of trespass to chattel will feel immediately familiar. The same architecture applies: a direct, intentional or negligent interference with something that belongs to another person, actionable without proof of damage, protecting possession rather than ownership. The difference is only in what is being protected. Trespass to land guards your right to exclusive enjoyment of a piece of ground. Trespass to chattel guards your right to exclusive enjoyment of your moveable property. One protects what you stand on; the other protects what you carry, drive, use, and own.

But where trespass to land has only itself as its closest companion, the protection of chattels is spread across three torts that overlap, interact, and sometimes compete: trespass to chattel, conversion, and detinue. Together they form the law of wrongful interference with goods, and understanding when each applies, and when all three might arise from the same facts, is one of the more technically demanding areas of Nigerian tort law.

What Is a Chattel?

A chattel is any moveable property capable of being owned, other than land and immovable things. Cars, motorcycles, generators, smartphones, livestock, spare parts, furniture, title deeds, cheques, and negotiable instruments are all chattels. The category is practically limitless. What links all chattels is that they can be moved and they can be owned. A car impounded by police, a generator borrowed and not returned, a certificate withheld by an examination body, and a cheque fraudulently collected by a bank are all chattels for the purposes of these three torts.

Trespass to Chattel

Trespass to chattel is the most foundational of the three. It is any direct and unlawful interference with a chattel in the possession of another person, whether intentionally or negligently done. The interference does not need to be violent or permanent. Even the wrongful moving of goods from one place to another, or the mere touching of a sensitive object without authorisation, can constitute trespass to chattel. The tort protects possession, not ownership.

There is a comparison worth drawing here with the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, which holds a person strictly liable for the escape of dangerous things accumulated on their land. Both that rule and trespass to chattel protect against interference with property interests, but in opposite directions: Rylands v Fletcher concerns something escaping from the defendant’s property and damaging the plaintiff’s; trespass to chattel concerns the defendant reaching into the plaintiff’s possession and interfering with what is there. Both, however, share the underlying idea that a person’s property interests deserve legal protection beyond what negligence alone can offer. Unlike Rylands v Fletcher, trespass to chattel is not a strict liability tort: the plaintiff must prove intention or negligence on the defendant’s part.

In Davies v Lagos City Council, Adefarasin J confirmed the principle that applies in Nigeria: “There may be a trespass without the infliction of any material damage by a mere taking or transportation. The seizure of the plaintiff’s vehicle without just cause is a wrongful act on account of which all the defendants taking part in it are jointly and severally liable.” The council had seized the plaintiff’s taxi cab from its pound after revoking his permit. Even though the revocation of the permit may have been within the council’s powers, the physical seizure of the vehicle went beyond what any statutory authority permitted, and was therefore trespass.

This principle resonates directly in daily Nigerian life. Police officers who impound vehicles at checkpoints beyond the period authorised by law, or whose instructions to impound came from a private individual using the police to settle a personal score, are involved in trespass to chattel. The Supreme Court in Ajao v Ashiru (1973) 1 All NLR Part II, page 51 held that those who instruct the police to seize property are jointly liable for the wrongful seizure alongside the officers who execute it. Nigerian courts have consistently maintained this position.

The key elements are intentional or negligent interference with the plaintiff’s possession and the plaintiff’s right to possession at the time. Any person in possession, not only the owner, may sue. A borrower, a hirer, a repairer, and a bailee all have sufficient possession to maintain an action against a stranger who interferes with the goods.

Conversion

If trespass to chattel is interference, conversion is dominion. Sir John Salmond defined it as “an act of wilful interference, without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of it.” Where trespass might describe the scratching of your car in a car park, conversion describes the stranger who drives it away and uses it as their own. The distinction is one of degree, and the courts have described it as the difference between minor interference and a denial of the plaintiff’s title and possession.

The connection between conversion and negligence is instructive. Where a person’s property is damaged through carelessness, the remedy is typically in negligence, which requires proof of a duty of care, breach, and resulting damage. Conversion is intentional: the defendant must have intentionally dealt with the goods in a way inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights. It is no defence to say you were mistaken about ownership. A car dealer who sells a vehicle belonging to a true owner commits conversion even if he believed in good faith that his client had authority to sell it. The intention to deal with the goods is sufficient; the intention to deprive the true owner is not additionally required.

In Chukwurah v C.F.A.O. Motors Ltd, the defendant’s garage, unable to recover a repair bill from the plaintiff who had delayed in settling it, had the plaintiff’s car re-registered in the name of a third party. Oputa J held the defendants liable in conversion. A lien, the court explained, gives only a right to retain possession pending payment; it does not give any right to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of the goods. The garage had gone beyond what the law permitted, and in doing so had asserted a right over the car inconsistent with the plaintiff’s title. That is the essence of conversion.

The Supreme Court in C.O.P v Oguntayo confirmed the foundational principle: against a wrongdoer, possession is title. Where the police impounded the respondent’s vehicle alleging it was lost property, but could not identify the true owner on whose behalf they were supposedly acting, the court held that the respondent’s factual possession was sufficient to ground a conversion claim. A defendant can only plead the better title of a third party if they are acting on that third party’s actual authority.

Conversion takes many forms: wrongful taking, destruction, unauthorised use, wrongful receipt, wrongful transfer of title, and refusal to return on demand. Where a finance company repossesses a hire purchase vehicle while the buyer is not actually in default, the finance company commits conversion. In Kosile v Folarin, the Supreme Court held that a motor dealer who wrongfully seized a vehicle sold on credit terms was liable, and that the plaintiff was entitled to its return, its value, and damages for loss of use.

Detinue

Detinue is the most specific of the three torts. It arises where the defendant is in possession of the plaintiff’s chattel and refuses to return it after a proper demand. The demand and the refusal are conditions precedent: without them, there is no detinue. The plaintiff must show title or right to immediate possession, a proper demand, and an unjustified refusal to comply.

What distinguishes detinue from conversion by detention is partly procedural and partly remedial. In detinue, the plaintiff may obtain an order for the specific return of the chattel, something unavailable in conversion, where the defendant always has the option of paying the market value in damages. Detinue is therefore the right action where the goods have sentimental, unique, or specialised value that money cannot adequately replace, or where the plaintiff simply wants the goods back rather than their monetary equivalent. In West Africa Examinations Council v Koroye, the plaintiff successfully claimed in detinue for the return of his examination certificate. In Stitch v A.G. Federation, the plaintiff’s imported car, detained by Customs and subsequently stripped for parts by the fourth defendant, was held to entitle the plaintiff to its assessed current market value, since specific return was no longer possible.

Damages in detinue are assessed at the date of the trial, not the date of the conversion. This matters where the goods have changed in value between the wrongful detention and the judgment. A plaintiff whose goods have appreciated should sue in detinue. A plaintiff whose goods have depreciated should sue in conversion.

Comparing the Three

Trespass to chattel protects against interference with possession. Conversion protects against denial of title and possession. Detinue protects against wrongful refusal to return on demand. They are three separate roads to the same destination, as one academic commentator has put it, the protection of proprietary and possessory interests in personal property. A single set of facts may give rise to all three simultaneously: where someone takes your car without authority, uses it for months, and then refuses to give it back when asked, there is trespass (the original taking), conversion (the use as one’s own), and detinue (the refusal to return on demand). In Nigeria, unlike in England where detinue was abolished by the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, all three torts remain available and may be claimed together in a single action.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I sue the police for seizing my vehicle at a checkpoint in Nigeria? Yes, if the seizure was without lawful authority. Both trespass to chattel and conversion may arise on those facts. The Supreme Court in Ajao v Ashiru confirms that those who instruct the police to seize property are jointly liable.

My hire purchase company seized my car claiming I missed a payment I did not miss. What is my remedy? This is conversion. Make a formal demand for return. If the company refuses, sue in both detinue and conversion. The Supreme Court in Kosile v Folarin held that a wrongful seizure under a credit sale agreement entitles the buyer to return of the vehicle, its value, and damages for loss of use.

A mechanic has my car and is refusing to release it until I pay more than we agreed. Is that detinue? Not necessarily at first, since a mechanic has a lien over goods for their lawful charges. However, if the amount claimed exceeds what was agreed, or if the mechanic damages or sells the car, the conduct may become conversion.

Conclusion

Trespass to chattel, conversion, and detinue together constitute the full framework for protecting Nigerian citizens and businesses from wrongful interference with their moveable property. From the police checkpoint seizure to the hire purchase repossession, from the withheld examination certificate to the garage that will not release your car, these torts cover the full spectrum of property interference that Nigerians encounter in practice.

For related reading, see Negligence in Torts and The Tort of Deceit for the overlap between fraudulent dealings and conversion.

References Kodilinye and Aluko, The Nigerian Law of Torts (Spectrum Books, Lagos, 1995) Eni Eja Alobo, Law of Tort (Princeton Publishing Company, 2013) Ese Malemi, Law of Tort (Princeton Publishing Company, 2013) C.O.P v Oguntayo (Supreme Court of Nigeria) Davies v Lagos City Council (Lagos High Court)