Judicial decision-making is one of the most consequential exercises of legal reasoning. The way judges analyze facts, interpret law, and arrive at conclusions affects not only the parties before them but also shapes the development of the law itself. Let’s explore how legal reasoning functions in the judicial process.

Introduction

Legal reasoning in judicial process refers to the careful thinking employed by judicial officers when resolving legal issues presented by parties in court. As ministers in the temple of justice, both lawyers and judges must tailor their legal reasoning toward ensuring justice for all parties.

The judiciary—the branch of government invested with judicial power—is often described as the “temple of justice.” It comprises the system of courts in a country, the body of judges, and the bench.¹ Their paramount duty is to foster justice.

While there is much debate surrounding the concept of law, even greater are the discussions about the concept of justice. Giorgio and Campbell define justice as “a principle of co-ordination between subjective beings.”² More plainly, Black’s Law Dictionary describes it as “proper administration of laws… the constant and perpetual disposition of legal matters or disputes to render every man his due.”³

Justice means different things to different people—some view it as mere “judicature,” others as “fair trial,” “equality,” or “morality.” Natural justice has crystallized into two legal maxims: audi alterem patem (hear both sides before deciding) and nemo judex in causa sua (one should not be a judge in one’s own case).

Shifting of Fact and Law in Court

Shifting of Fact

Section 2(1) of the Evidence Act defines a “fact” to include:

• Anything, state of things, or relation of things capable of being perceived by the senses
• Any mental condition of which any person is conscious⁴

In both criminal and civil proceedings, certain facts warrant the course of action. For example, if Mr. Okon sells his law textbook to Mr. Sanni for ₦10, with Mr. Sanni making a part payment of ₦5 and promising to pay the balance in two weeks but fails to do so, Mr. Okon might sue for the balance. The facts would include:

• Mr. Okon sold his law textbook to Mr. Sanni for ₦10
• Mr. Sanni agreed to buy and made part payment of ₦5
• Mr. Sanni promised to pay the balance in two weeks
• Mr. Sanni did not pay the balance after two weeks

Parties must prove the existence or non-existence of facts in issue. “Shifting of fact” refers to the obligation to present evidence on a particular fact in issue. This burden shifts between parties depending on their pleadings. When one party discharges the evidential burden, their opponent must either disprove such facts or neutralize them.

This principle is based on the rule that whoever wants a court to give judgment on facts they assert must prove those facts exist.⁵

Shifting of Fact in Civil Cases

In civil proceedings, only “facts in issue” need proving. These are defined as: “All such facts that a plaintiff in a civil case must prove in order to establish his claim, if they are not admitted expressly or by implication by the Defendant.”⁶

The Latin maxim Affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio applies—the burden of proof lies on the one who affirms, not upon one who denies. When a defendant denies facts in the plaintiff’s claim, the burden of proving the denied facts falls on the plaintiff.

The burden can shift. If Mr. Sanni denies promising to pay the ₦5 balance but Mr. Okon produces a payment memorandum signed by Mr. Sanni, the burden shifts to Mr. Sanni to prove the document is not genuine.

When a defendant confesses the truth of an allegation but provides new facts that alter the case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove these new facts—this is called “confessing and avoiding.”

Shifting of Fact in Criminal Cases

In criminal matters, the general rule is that the burden of proving facts rests solely on the prosecution.⁷ This is supported by section 33(5) of the 1979 Constitution, which presumes innocence until proven guilty, and section 137(2) of the Evidence Act.

In our earlier example, if Mr. Ajibola is charged with robbing Mr. Akpan of his car, the prosecution must prove all elements constituting robbery. In Okagbue v. Commissioner of Police, the court affirmed that the accused need not prove their innocence.⁸

However, exceptions exist where the burden shifts to the accused:

• When the accused raises a defense of exemption or qualification from the law
• When a statute specifically imposes the burden on the accused
• When special facts are within the accused’s knowledge
• When the accused raises defenses of intoxication or insanity⁹

Shifting of Law

The Latin maxim Ignorantia facti excusat: Ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of fact excuses; ignorance of law does not) applies here. Law may be defined as a body of rules regulating human conduct within a community, which by common consent shall be enforced by external power, a concept further explained in our guide on law in social context.

In practice, parties must cite the specific laws they rely on. Shifting of law occurs when a party relies on a law not knowing it has been amended or repealed. The burden of informing the court shifts to the person aware of the change.

The principle Juria novit curia (it is for the court to know the law) mitigates this burden. As Justice Ijalaye noted: “Judges should be able to catch up with the dynamics of our ever-changing society… Ignorantia judicis est Calamitas Innocientis (The ignorance of the judge is the calamity of the innocent).”¹⁰

Shifting of fact typically occurs first during the hearing or trial stage, while shifting of law occurs during the address stage, primarily between counsels. If they fail to prove any law they should have relied upon, the burden shifts to the judge, who is presumed to know the law.

Judicial Precedent

The doctrine of judicial precedent (stare decisis) holds that a decision of a judge on a question of law binds both that judge and subsequent judges in courts of lower rank to decide the same question in the same way.

According to Farrar, English case law combines reasoning by analogy with reasoning by rules.¹¹ Analogy in law involves determined inference based on points of resemblance between cases, while reasoning by rules involves classification techniques for enunciating principles, as outlined in our resource on legal reasoning and approach to problems.

Judicial precedent emerged from common law. Before adequate statutes regulated human activities, judges formulated principles through case decisions. Despite increasing legislation, large areas of law remain primarily judge-made, such as principles requiring malice for murder, requiring contract performance or damages in default, and prohibiting defamatory writing.

Precedents may be binding or persuasive. Binding precedents come from higher courts and must be followed by lower courts. Persuasive precedents come from courts of coordinate jurisdiction or foreign courts.

Ratio Decidendi

Not the entire body of a decided case constitutes precedent. What binds future cases is the ratio decidendi—the reason for the decision or the legal rule upon which the decision is based.

How do courts determine the ratio decidendi? Goodhart suggested it is found by identifying:

• The facts treated by the judge as material
• The judge’s decision based on those facts
• Facts held to be immaterial¹²

Stone criticized this approach, arguing that determining the ratio involves choosing an appropriate level of generality. He analyzed Donoghue v. Stevenson to show how the range of facts could be stated at different levels, from specific (agents of harm, vehicle of harm) to general (plaintiff’s identity, discoverability of harm).¹³

Finding the Ratio of Decisions in Appeal Courts

When a court has multiple judges, identifying the ratio decidendi becomes more complex:

• When majority judgments are consistent and based on the same legal principle, that principle is the ratio decidendi
• When majority judgments are consistent but based on different legal principles, all principles constitute the ratio decidendi¹⁴
• When majority judgments are inconsistent, there is no clear ratio decidendi
• When the court is equally divided, the presumption favors the negative (semper praesumitur pro negante), meaning the lower court’s decision becomes the ratio of the higher court

Per Incuriam

Decisions described as per incuriam (through carelessness) are actually per ignorantium (through ignorance). This term applies when a relevant statute or rule affecting the decision wasn’t brought to the court’s attention or considered by the judge.

No court is bound by its own decision made per incuriam, but lower courts must follow higher court decisions even if made per incuriam. As Thompson J. stated in Board of Customs and Excise v. Bolarinwa: “A Magistrate is bound by a High Court decision and has no discretion… If the High Court decision is wrong, the Magistrate is still bound with it as it is not within its jurisdiction to condemn a decision of the High Court.”¹⁵

Obiter Dictum

Obiter dictum refers to statements of law made incidentally in a judgment, not relevant to the issue before the court. Goodhart viewed obiter dictum as conclusions based on facts not determined by the court.

While ratio decidendi creates binding precedent, obiter dicta may be worthy of consideration depending on the court level and the judge’s erudition. When the Supreme Court makes general statements about the law to settle uncertainty, these statements, though technically obiter dicta, are considered a “superior species” and likely to be followed by lower courts.

Distinguishing Cases

Court decisions are not binding precedents for cases with different material facts. Courts may distinguish cases by pointing out essential differences between the present and earlier case.

Distinguishing differs from refusing to follow or overruling an earlier case. It involves accepting the earlier case as good law while finding factual differences justifying a different outcome.

Glanville Williams identified two forms: non-restrictive distinguishing (accepting the ratio but finding material differences in facts) and restrictive distinguishing (cutting down the ratio by treating additional facts as material).¹⁶

Factors Affecting the Weight of a Precedent

Several factors influence how much weight courts give to precedents:

• Age: Older precedents generally command greater respect
• Court status and composition: Decisions from higher courts or distinguished judges carry more weight
• Law report adequacy: Well-reported cases have greater influence than poorly documented ones
• Precedent history: Cases repeatedly applied in later decisions gain strength
• Unanimity: Unanimous decisions typically carry more weight than those with dissenting opinions

Hierarchy of Courts and Judicial Precedents

The doctrine of judicial precedent requires a settled hierarchy of courts and a system of law reporting. In Nigeria, section 6(5) of the 1999 Constitution lists the superior courts of record, as detailed in our guide on sources of law in Nigeria:

• Supreme Court of Nigeria
• Federal Court of Appeal
• Federal High Court
• High Court of a State
• Sharia Court of Appeal of a State
• Customary Court of Appeal of a State

The Supreme Court

Supreme Court decisions bind all other Nigerian courts. While the doctrine of precedent doesn’t directly apply to Customary Courts, Area Courts, or Sharia Courts of Appeal, they should follow Supreme Court decisions through the appellate system.

Regarding its own decisions, the Supreme Court in Bronik Motors Ltd. & Anor v. Wema Bank adopted Lord Gardener’s Practice Direction, stating it would only depart from precedent when:

• There is a breach of justice
• On grounds of public policy
• When a question of legal principle would perpetuate injustice if retained¹⁷

In Abdulkarim v. Incar Nigeria Ltd., the Supreme Court affirmed it would “not hesitate to overrule any decision of its own which she is satisfied was reached on wrong principle, since this is the only way to keep the stream of justice pure.”¹⁸

The Court of Appeal

Nigeria’s Court of Appeal follows the practice established in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., binding itself to previous decisions except in three circumstances:

• When deciding between two conflicting decisions
• When refusing to follow its own decision incompatible with a Supreme Court decision
• When its own decision was given per incuriam¹⁹

In criminal matters, the Court of Appeal doesn’t consider itself strictly bound by previous rulings but is reluctant to depart from them unless considered wrong.

Federal High Court and State High Courts

The Federal High Court binds all Magistrate and District Courts in Nigeria and is itself bound by Court of Appeal and Supreme Court precedents.

State High Courts are of coordinate jurisdiction with each other and the Federal High Court. Their decisions serve as persuasive precedent for other High Courts. As held in Barclays Bank v. Hassan: “A judge of a High Court does not feel himself bound by his own decision or by those of other judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction.”²⁰

Conclusion

Legal reasoning in judicial process aims to achieve justice through the proper application of legal principles, precedents, and rules. The complexity of shifting fact and law, determining ratio decidendi, distinguishing cases, and following precedent demonstrates the intellectual rigor required in judicial decision-making.

Understanding these processes provides insight into how courts operate and how the law develops. While precedent creates stability and predictability, the law remains dynamic, allowing judges to distinguish cases or, in limited circumstances, depart from previous decisions to serve justice and adapt to changing social conditions.

These judicial reasoning principles are essential for effective legal research and legal writing, as they help law students understand how to analyze cases and construct persuasive legal arguments based on precedent.

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Footnotes

1. Black, H.C., Black’s Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, Abridged Sixth Edition, West Group Publisher, U.S. Centennial Edition (1891-1991), p. 593. ↩

2. Giorgis & Campbell, Justice – An Historical and Philosophical Essay, University Press, Edinburgh, (1952) 1st ed., p. 2. ↩

3. Black, H.C., op. cit., p. 599. ↩

4. Section 2(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap E4 LFN 2004. ↩

5. See Section 134(1) of the Evidence Act. Also, see the application of the principle in Elemo & Others v. Omolade & Others (1968) NMLR 359. ↩

6. T.A. Aguda, The Law of Evidence, Spectrum Law Publishing, Ibadan, 3rd ed., 1989, p. 8. ↩

7. F. Nwadialo, Modern Nigerian Law of Evidence, Ethiope Publishing Corp. (1981) p. 165. ↩

8. (1965) N.M.L.R. 233. ↩

9. See the cases of Simi Johnson v. Commissioner of Police (1960) W.N.L.R. 118, Obinga and Ors. v. Police (1965) N.MLR.172, Christopher Otti v. Inspector General of Police (1956) N.R.N.L.R. I, and Mathew Onakoya v. R (1959) 4 FSC 150. ↩

10. D.A. Ijalaye, “Justice as Administered by the Nigerian Courts” Justice Idigbe Memorial Lecture Series Five (1992) at p. 64. ↩

11. J.H. Farrar & A. M Dugdale, Introduction to Legal Method, 1984, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2nd ed., p. 84. ↩

12. Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law, pp. 25-26. See also (1959) 21 M.L.R, pp. 123-124. ↩

13. “The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi,” (1959) 22 M.L.R. 597. ↩

14. See the application of the Principle in Jacobs v. L.C.C. (1950) A.C. 361 at 369. ↩

15. 1973 1 NMLR 179. ↩

16. G. Williams, Learning the Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 11th ed., 1982, p. 175. ↩

17. (1983) NSCC p. 225. ↩

18. (1992) 7 SCNJ p. 366. ↩

19. (1944) K.B. 718. ↩

20. (1954) 21 NLR 1. ↩